Abstract: Trust is generally held to have three different dimensions or asp ects: a behavioral aspect, a cognitive aspect, and an affective aspect. While t here is ha rdly any disagreement about trusting behavior, there is some disagreement as to w hich of the two other aspects is more fundamental. After presenting some of the main ideas concerning the concept of trust as used in the analysis of social cooperation. I will argue that affective aspects of trust must be included in any adequate account of the role of trust in social dilemma situations involving multiple equilibria. Cooperation in such situations requires coordination even though information on what another player might do is not available. A trusting person can handle such problems of cooperation by fr aming the situation in a way that goes beyond cognitive trust and solves what I shall call the problern of normative consent. I w ill conclude wit h some rem arks ab out the design of institutions that fost er trustful cooperation, espedally in the context of the Internet.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to present some of the main approach es to the concept of trust as used in the social sciences, in psych ology and philosophy. This sh ould prov ide the theoretical background for the a nalysis of t he p rob lern of t rust in Internet communication.
I will illustrate my consider a tions with some simple examples suited to the context ofinternet communication, but my argum ent is concerned with the social problern of trust in gen eral. I will discuss the problern of trust in the context of the general p roblern of social cooperation. The problern of coop eration 1s analyzed as composed of three sub-problems, which I w ill call:
• the problern of coop e rative incentives,
• the problern of information, a nd
• the problern of normative consent.
Most theorist s agree that trust is a complex phenom enon consisting of b eh avior al elements, as well as cognitive and affective elemen ts. These elem ents or asp ects of trust a r e closely r elated to the three sub-pr oblem s of cooperation me ntioned above.
Trusting behavior is cha ract erized by a certain form of risk, namely the r isk t h at anothe r p erson ma y act in undesired ways (section 2). M ost cooperative endeavors a re cha racterized by su ch a risk. A ra tional individual can incur such a risk only if she has reason to believe that others will respond cooperatively. So, the most basic problern of trusting behavior is a problem of cooperative incentives (section 3). For the most part, finding out what others a re motiva ted to do tends to be difficult. Rational trust does not only require that t he ince ntives of others are in fact such as to motivate cooperative behavior, but a trusting person must also be sufficiently informed of these incentives. This problem of information (section 4) points to the importance of cognitive element s of trust a nd, thus, to the concept of cognitive trust (section 5). Trust is affective in charact er in that it induces the trusting p e rson to perceive his p a rtner a nd t h e relevant conditions of their interaction in a specific way.
1 Such affective trust (section 6) may become important, if a trusting decision cannot b e based on inform at ion about the incentives of others. The problem of normative consent typifies a class of social situations where such is necessarily the case (sect ion 7) .
As stated above, there is wide agreement among schola rs t hat trust in gen eral is characterized by behavioral as well as cognitive and affective elements. B u t when it comes to a definition of trust-----surprisingly-one finds predomin antly cognitive accounts of trust (I will give a few examples in sect ion 5). To be sure, ther e are accounts of affec tive trust as well (I will give a few exam ples in section 6). Yet, these do not seem to play an essential role in the a nalysis of social cooperation. However, I will a rgue tha t this is due to t he m isguided concentration on the problern of coop erative incentives and the problern of informa t ion. As I will show, there a r e significa nt cooper a tive endeavors, w hich a re characterized by a problern of n ormative con sent. The proble rn of trusting b eh avior wit h in these situations ca nnot b e solved w ithout some affective trust . So, if the pr oblern of n ormative consent is taken into account, it b ecom es clear t hat affective elem ents of trust ma y very w ell play an importa nt role in social coop er a tion.
Although I am mainly concerned w ith conceptual issu es h er e, it is n ot my inte ntion to give one single, all-e ncompassing defini tion of t r ust . Of course t here a re problems in the context of social coopera tion, the analysis of w hich afford a sp ecific definit ion of trust. But this m ay d ep end on t he sp ecific pr opert ies of the problern a t h a nd. So, a general definition of the concept of t r ust m ay not b e very h elpful in such cases. 2 One can, h owever, identify the main asp ects of t rust t hat m a y pla y m a jor roles in the a nalysis of social co operation. Thus, based on a discussion of some of the m ore prominent approach es to the phen om en on of trust, I w ill indicate w h at I ta ke to b e the decisive asp ects of trust in this r egard. In specifying t h e concepts of b eh avior al trust , cognitive trust and affective t r ust , I h op e to pr ovide a con cep t ual fra m ework t h at m ay guide us in our study of t rusting coop er ation, within the internet as well as in other social context s .
Trusting Behavior
Risk is generally held to be one of the main chara>::teristics of trust: the risk that another person may act in ways, which are disadvantageous to the trusting person. In fact, nobody can escape such risks completely. Given the world as it is, we have to face the fa>::t that other people do interfere with our personal plans every now and then. But a trusting person is characterized by the fact that he willingly incurs such risks. He takes these risks, even though he is in a position to rule out such risks. He a>::ts in ways that actually produce relevant opportunities for the person being trusted to do so mething harmful to him. This is what I caJI trusting behavior or behavioral trust:
A person is slwwing trusting behavior or behavioraJ trust, if she (he) is making herself (himself) vulnerable to the actions of another person.
Trusting behavior is needed in most cooperative projects. This is, of course, the main reason, why sociaJ scientists are interested in trust. Figure 1 shows a simple model of a problern of cooperation to illustrate this point. One may think of the situation after bidder Adam won an auction at eBay in which seller Berta offered some product, say, a first edition of Hume's 1rea-tise. Adam now has tosend Berta the payment (plus the transaction costs) as promised in his bid to Berta before she in turn should send the book. If he does in factsend the money (which is CA in the model), she can keep it and still decide on how to react. For the sake of simplicity, Iet us assume that Berta has only 2 options: she can either keep the book (depicted here as DB) or senditto Adam (OB)· By mutually cooperating, both agents can improve their initiaJ situation. It is assumed that there is some standard of value for ea>::h of them such that the initial situa tion, which will be retained if Ada m does n ot sen d t he paym ent (D A) , ma y be ra ted by each of them as of value 0, while the cooperative solution bea r s a prospect of 1 for each. Both would gain from the r ealization of the exch a nge (CA; CE)· But the coop erative surplus ca n be achieved on ly if Ad am chooses option CA , tha t is , if he decides tosend the m oney first. Yet, then Bert a-being already in the possession of the money-can decide independen tly on h er own move. 
The Problem of Cooperative Incentives
In the given game, which is known as the 'trust game' (K reps 1990), it is assu med tha t Berta would gain from keeping the b o ok, tha t is, from 'defecting ,' If t h is is in fact the case, and if Adam a nd Berta a re solely mot ivated by t h e given p ayoffs, and if they are p erfectly informed of this, no cooper ation is r ationally possible. A r a tional Berta w ill defect , a nd a ra tional A dam anticipating this will n ot coop erate in the fi rst place. (D A, DB) is the u n ique equilibrium of t he t rust game. Without a solution to the underlying incentive p r oblem , t her e can b e no ra tional trusting b eh avior in a sit uation like the on e described here. Now, a ny situation of successive exch a nge seems to be basically of t h is sort a nd, in the sam e way, bila teral simulta neaus excha n ge is usually a Prisoner's Dilemma situation. Ye t , as we all know t he exch a n ge of good s and services is indeed possible in the real world. If we do not want to assu me widespr ead irrationality, w e are driven to infer t h at the re must be certain aspects of social inte raction which solve or a t least avoid the problem of cooperative incentives. Three examples of m echa nisms tha t can m a ke coop era tion possible a re:
1. Internalized morals: Berta migh t be motivated to repay a cooperative m ove for moral or fairness reasons.
Institutional enforcement:
Berta m ay b e d eterred from defection by formal san ctions (e.g., she might fear b eing t a ken to court) .
3. R eput ation: Berta may coop e ra te b ecause tha t m ight give h er add itional opportunities to sell goods a t eBay, for if sh e defects, no one will t rust h er in tha t fo ru m again.
It is qu ite p la usib le t h at in our eBa y example mechanisms of all t h ree sorts are actually at work. It sh ould be noted, h owever , that t h ese m echanisms work in very d ifferent ways. Internalized m orals a re effective by having a direct imp act on t he ut ility functions of actors. E n forcement mech anisms work by effectively cha n ging the con seque nces of action. And a r eputation m echanism operates by placing t he situation into a la rger social context. But, in the end, all three mech anisms h ave the same effect : defection becomes less att ract ive and possibly utterly unattractive for Berta.
If mechanisms like these are effective, the game is changed in fundamental ways. One may think that, given such a mechanism, the actual game Iooks like the one depicted in figure 2. This game differs from the foregoing game in one single respect, namely that Berta assesses one-sided defection now as less valuable than mutual cooperation. This is represented by a different utility value b*<i. Of course, things Iook q uite different in reali ty. Most actual mechanisms for overcoming the problern of cooperative incentives work in uncertain ways, and what they do to one actor is to a !arge extent hidden from other individuals. This is especially true for morality, but it also applies to other mechanisms such as reputation or even the legal system. So, the problern of cooperative incentives can be solved and people will as a rule know that it may be solved in general. However, there are hardly any actual situations in which a person can be sure that the solution in fact applies to the case at hand. There is almost always some insecurity involved in a real life mechanism for overcoming the problern of cooperat ive incentives. T his is precisely where trust enters the scene.
The Problem of Information
An actual situation would Iook more like t he following: Adam knows that he is involved in a trust game situation as described in purely monet ary payoffs. But he does not really know how Berta actually values t he consequences of a course of actions in which Adam first cooperates and Berta then defect s. If her utility value for such a course of action is smaller than her utility for mutual cooperation, Berta will respond cooperatively, but if it is greater, she will not.
As Adam is not informed of Berta's preferences, the game theorist would classify the situation as one of 'incomplete informat ion' . Following J . C. Harsanyi (1967 /68), the most extensive form games of incomplete information may be transformed into agame of complete but imperfect information. 4 Figure 3 shows a formal model of the given situation.
It is assumed that Adam and Berta are to play one of the foregoing games ( figure 1, figure 2 ) . Before the actual interaction starts, Nature chooses, which game is to be played, i.e., Nature chooses the preferences of actor Berta for the case of a one-sided defection by Berta as being either b > 1 or b* < 1 (Nature chooses the 't ype' of player Bert a). With probability p Nature chooses b* < 1 (Berta will cooperate) and, accordingly, with probability 1 -p : b > 1 (Berta will defect). Berta can observe what Nature chooses (that is , Berta knows her preferences), but Adam cannot. This is r epresented in t he model by the horizontal line between Adam's decision nodes. Adam d oes not know which of the two nodes he is actually occupying when he has to make h is choice. However, Adam does know the value of p.
The parameter p represents Adam's subjective probabilit y estimation t hat Berta has cooperative preferences. Obviously, the total game n ow gives a fairly good representation of Adam's (and Berta's) situation as describ ed a t the beginning of this section. A rational Adam will cooperate if he believes it probable enough that Berta will respond in the same way. Using this m od el, this can be made more precise: Adam will cooperate if his expected utility of this choice is larger than his expected utility of a defection. Therefor e, Adam will cooperate if the following inequality holds:
And he will defect if p is smaller than a/ ( a-1). Thus, we ha ve found a condition for trusting behav ior . It will occur only if the possible loss is sufficiently small a nd if the subjective p rob ability of a cooperative response is sufficiently large. This points us to two new aspect s of the problern of cooperation. First, there is a different form of t he problern of cooperative incentives now concerning the incentives of the per son t h at is to trust: the possible loss is to be sufficiently small. Second, t h ere is a p roblern con cerning informat ion. The bidder w ill cooperate only if he has sufficient clues for a cooperative response. So, h e is in need of sufficien tly relia ble informat ion on the incentives and the motivation of his partner.
The a n alysis thus far points us to three conditions of rational trust in g b eh avwr:
1. 'Trustworthiness' must be possible, that is, ther e must be som e incentive to reciprocat e a cooperative move.
2. The possible loss due to an unanswered cooperative move must b e sufficie ntly small.
3. The trusting p erson must b e sufficiently assured that his p a rtner will abstain from abusing his trusting move.
Thus, in v iew of promoting t rustful coope ra tion, t h e fir st two conditions point to a p rob lern of coop e rative incentives and the third condition p oints to a proble rn of informa tion.
Cognitive Trust
In a m ore n a rrow sen se, trust is not just a sp ecific way of acting in certain situations. It is r ather some thing tha t makes us act in such ways. It is a m ental state ( or a disposition) that cha racterizes all or a t least most of the individuals that a re engaged in trusting behavior. We refer to this m ental stat e to exp lain these individuals' behavior. But what kind of mental state is this?
The preceding might suggest the following: A person w ill be r eady t o p erform a cooperative move if a nd only if he expects with sufficient cert ainty t h at his partner will answer in corresponding ways. This su ggests t hat t r ust b e u nderstood as an expectation of a positive response.
In fact, ma ny theorists of trust w ould support su ch a con cep t ualization of trust in some way or othe r. A prominent example is D iego G a mbetta. In the conclusion of his n ow famous reader on trust, he gives t he following d efinit ion: 5 "trust (or, symmetrically, distrust ) is a p a rticular level of t h e su b jective probability with w hich an agent assesses that a n oth er agent or gr oup of agents will p erform a pa rticular action, b oth befor e h e can monitorsuch action (or inde p endently of his capacity ever tobe able to monitor it) andin a context in which it affect s h is own action." (Gambetta 1988, 217) A p articula rly at tractive feature of t his account is t hat it explicates the evasive con cept of ' trust' in terms of a well-known b asic con cept of Rational Choice theory, na m ely in terms of b elief. However , it seems that one cannot distinguish b etween genu ine trust a nd pure r eliance within this accou nt. Independently of the underly ing justification, a ny b elief tha t another per son will act in d esira ble ways will amount to trust. So, if a burgla r relies on t he incomp etence of the local policema n , he is trusting in the sense of G a mbetta . But , in everyday inter course, we usually make a differ en ce h er e. The burgla r m ay r ely, b ut h e does not trust.
There a re mainly two ways to reply t o such an objection. F irst, one can stick to the d efinition as given a nd a rgu e tha t t h e p roposed differen tiation is eit h er n ot based on a real clear-cut differen ce or-if it is-it is a d ifference wh ich is la rgely irrelevant for the a n alysis of social interaction. Russell Hardin argues in this ma nner (Ha rdin 1992; 1996 ; seealso his pap er in t h is volume). The second way to reply would be to admit that t h ere is indeed a relevant differen ce and to t ry t o p rovide some expla nation for this differe nce by fur ther specifyin g t h e object of t he relevant expectations t hat may count as genuine trust as compared to p ure relia n ce. Two p rominent examp les, on e by a ph ilosopher, t h e oth er by a sociologist , may illust rate t his second approach.
For Annet te Baie r, trusting expectations are concerned with t h e goodwill of a nothe r person: "Wha t is the differ en ce b etween trusting other s a nd merely r elying on them ? It seem s to be r elia n ce on t h eir goodwill toward one, as d istinct from t h eir depen dable habits , or only on their dependably exhib ited fear , a nger , or other motives compa tible wit h ill will t oward on e, or on motives not d irected at on e a t all." (Baier 1986, 234) The sociologist Benjamin Barber gives a somewha t broader account. For him, trust is, in general, an expectation that others will act according to some mutually accepted normative order. He is specifically concerned with role performance or fiduciary obligations: "For my purpose, I have selected three kinds of expectations tha t involve some of the fundamental meanings of trust . The most general is expectation of the persistence and fulfilment of t he natural and social moral orders. Second is expectation of technically competent role p erformance [ ... ] . And third is expectation that par t ners in interactionwill carry out their fiduciary obligations and responsibilities, that is, their duties in certain situations t o place other's interest before their own." (Barber 1983, 9) Note that both accounts basically define trust as a cognitive element in the mental state of an individual, namely as an expectation concerning the actions of another person and their specific background. Any such account may be called an account of cognitive trust. So in the most general sen se:
A person is in the state of cognitive trust, if he or she expects another person not to abuse options given to this other person as a result of trusting behavior.
I h ave deliberately left it open he re as to wh ether further specification r egarding t he characteristic objects of these expectations are useful or adequate. It seems to m e that this w ill most probably depend on the intention associated w ith a specific r esearch project. Moreover, the principal d ifference b etween t r ust in a more narrow sense and pure reliance is best understood as grounded in the specific affective character of genuine trust in a narrow sen se. To this I turn now.
Affective Trust
In refuta tion of a purely cognitive account of trust , it m ay be argued t h at trust is som ething more fun damental than a cognitive belief since a trusting person forms her beliefs in ch aracteristic ways that go beyond cognition.
If, for instance, a person is accused of some crime, her friend might come to beliefs about the actual matter, w hich vary greatly from what all others b elieve. A nd this can actually b e the case although the friend has no special evidence rega rding the matter at hand and must base his beliefs on the same information as all others. It is because h e trusts he r that his beliefs are different. So, trust seems to b e part of the psych ological mechanism that transforms t h e information given to indiv iduals into beliefs. If this argument is sound, trust may not b e r educed to cognitive b eliefs althou gh trust will usually result in t rusting b eliefs and exp ectation s.
One may eit h er react in a negative or an affirmative manner to this sort of criticism. The n egative reaction r ejects the assump tion t h at ther e is som et h ing special about a trusting person forming his beliefs. Whatever t he beliefs of a trusting person are, they are based on the relevant information t he person has accumulated over time. This information is formed into the r espective beliefs by general learning processes and rational reflection. A t rust ing person is no different in this respect than any other person. If his beliefs are different this must be due to a different source of information. T his, I believe, is R ussell Hardin's position (Hardin 1992 ). In the case of a frien d, Hardin wou ld a rgue that the friend in fact does possess some relevant private information, which he gained through his particularly close relationship to t he person accused of the cnme.
The affirmative reaction, on the other hand, concludes t hat t rust is best understood as an affective or emotional attitude that operates as a filter: it determines how a situation and other people involved in t his sit uation a re perceived. If this is true, trust is a psychological phenomenon beyond the scope of pure Rational Choice analysis. Any Rational Choice analysis has to start from some model of a social situation as given to the actors. But this p osition claims that no adequate model of a situation as perceived by a trusting actor can be given without reference to the psychological mechanism of trust.
Here are, again, a few examples of accounts of trust as an affective att itude:
The philosopher Richard Holton holds that trusting expectations a re n ot just cognitive beliefs, but normative in character. This is due to t he fact t hat a trusting person is disposed to react in an emotional way to any disappointment of his expectations. Thus, trust is characterized by what P eter Strawson (19 74) calls a participant attitude: "In cases w he re we trust and are let down, we do not just feel disappointed, as we would if a machine let us down .... We feel betrayed . . . . betrayal is one of those attitudes that Strawson calls r eactive a ttitudes. . .. I think tha t the difference between trust and r eliance is that trust involves something like a participant stance towards t he p erson you a re trusting." (Holton 1994, 66f .)
The sociologists David Lewis and Andrew Weigert claim t hat t h e affective component of trust consists in a n emotional bond among those w ho participate in a relationship:
"The sociological foundation of trust is also constru cted on a n emotional base that is complementary to its cognitive base. This affective component of trust consists in an emotional bond among all those who participate in the relationship." "Trust begins wh ere prediction ends." (Lewis/ W eigert 1985, 971, 976) In their seminal paper on trust in p ersonal r elationships, J ohn Rempel and his colleagues determine one fundamental element of trust, nam ely faith as a sense of emotion al security in the face of a n uncertain future: " ... faith reflects an emotional security on the part of individuals, which enables them to go beyond the available evidence and feel, with assurance, that their partnerwill be responsive and caring despite the vicissitudes of an uncertain future." (Rempel/Holmes/ Zanna 1985, 97) It seems to me that even Niklas Luhman's well-known definition of t rust as a mechanism to reduce social complexity is to be understood in this vein: " ... Vertrauen ist keine Folgerung aus der Vergangenh eit , sondern es überzieht die Informationen, die es aus der Vergan genheit besitzt und riskiert eine Bestimmung der Zukunft. Im Akt des Vertrauens wird die Komplexität der zukünftigen Welt reduziert." (Luhman n 1989, 20) Of course, Luhman avoids psychological talk, but what he is saying, in effec t, is that a trusting person perceives the world in a certain way-as less complex as it in fact is.
It would take us beyond the scope of this discussion t o cite all m ajor affective accounts of trust or to weigh all the pros and cons of these positions. Let me simply offer what I consider to be a reasonable account of t rust as an emotional attitude:
1. Holton is right in claiming that a trusting person is disposed t o r eact to a misuse of his trust in a particular a nd emotional way. This is due to the fact that the p erson being trusted is seen as a r esponsive person consciously e ngaged in inte raction with the trusting person. As the author of his acts, the p erson being trusted is h eld responsible, a n d, t hus, the expectations of the trusting person are norma tive in character. In t his sense, trust is characterized by a p articipant attitude.
2. Identifying the affective aspect of trust as con sisting of emotion al bonds is not suita ble for grasping the possibly broad basis that t he nor mative expectations of trust may have. In partic ular, it is q uestionable as to wh ethe r such a concept of affective trust can account for cases such as trust in promises, which may occur between persans n ot connected by any personal relation ship w hatsoever. Still, they are connected by sh a red n orma tive conv ic tions a b out the obligations a promise induces.
Thus, the core aspects of affective t rust seem to be a p articipant attitude and connectedness in interest s or normative conv ictions in the sense of perceiving the trusted person as someon e driven by agreeable motives and comm itted to sh ared n ormative sta ndards. This explains t h e normative ch aracter of trusting expectations . H e wh o trust s another makes hirnself v ulne rable b ecause h e perceives h is partner as b eing connected to hirnself by sh a red aims or values. For the t rustor, t his mean s t h at a situation of trust is one w hich calls for t h e realization of su ch aims or for observing sh ared norms as part of a cooperative en terpr ise.
Both of these key elements in affective interpersonal trust, a p a rticipant a ttitude and 'connectedness' 6 in interests or normative convictions, a r e emotional in character. They essentially ch a racterize the way in which t he p a rt ner a nd the relevant part of the world are perceiv ed in trustful inter action. This way of seeing things will, as a rule, make the trustor have t h e typ ical t rust ful expectations. So , there is a causal relationship between affective t r ust and b elief. Yet, by inducing certain pa tterns in the way in which the world is r ep resented in thought and in the way certain contents of thought are associated wit h each other, trust prima rily determines how a trusting p e rson t h in ks. Thus , t his sort of trust ca nnot b e understood as a pure result of ra tion al consideration , it is ra ther a frame for rational conside ra tions .
Thus, I offer the following as a reasona ble account of t r ust as a n affective a ttitude:
Trust as an emotional attitude toward a person includes a participant attitude and a feeling of connectedness to him or her by shared aims, values or norms. T his attitude allows the trusting person to incur risks concerning the actions of the trusted person, as they are perceived as being guided by the normative f undament of trust, which is perceived as shared.
As I said, I ca nnot argue for this account of affective trust in a n y d etail h ere. All I can do is h op e t hat the reader m ay fi nd the accou nt sufficien tly plausible or a t least n ot impla usible. Neither can I a r gue for or against the claim t h at affective trust is mor e funda m ental tha n cognitive trust in t h e a n alysis of t rust ing b eh avior in social coop era tion. To b e su re, ther e are cases of social cooperation in w hich the affective asp ect of trust does n ot play a ny par ticularly sign ificant role. B ut I will argue now tha t there a re also p roblem s of cooperation, wh ich cannot be solved b y cognitive trust alon e, b ut may indeed b e solved by a sh a red n ormative fra m e a nd affective trust. It seems to m e that t hese cases m ay not b e n eglected as b eing of minor importance. If this is correct , affective elements of trust do in fact p lay a m ajor r ole in social cooper a tion.
The Proble m of Normative Conse nt
Consider t h e following example:
Two scientist s work on similar problem s, a nd they migh t exch ange inform ation on their find ings v ia the Internet . E ach m ay profit from t he progress of h is partn er. B u t at t he same time, sh aring pr ivate information on scientific progress wit h a nothe r per son b efor e pu blishing m eans investing t ime a n d effort in commu nication and-wh a t is probably more importa nt-it may mean ru n ning the risk of being out p erformed b y the other and losing som e or all of t h e benefit s of a uthorship. So, t h ere is a n incentive t o m inimize on t h e amou nt and q uality of information given away. Moreover, if one does in fact decide to hide cr ucial information, the other will not instantly be in a position to know that t his is the case.
If the situation is conceptualized as a strategic interaction in which both individuals have two options, namely either to cooperat e, t hat is, t o share all relevant information, or to defect, that is, to give away only minor or defective information, then the situation as described may well be one of a Prisoners' Dilemma. So there is a problern of cooperative incentives.
Suppose that there is a solution to this problem. Imagine, for instance, the situation is suchthat whatever the two scientists do becomes kn own t o a lar ger part of the scientific community eventually. Imagine also that this part of the scientific community generally rewards cooperative behavior, t hat t hey confer additional scientific respect to cooperators and supply cooper ative colleagues with opportunities of further cooperative endeavors. Depending on how the two scientists in question value those additional opport u nities and the esteem of their colleagues, they may prefer mutual cooperation to ta king advantage of a colleague. Of course, there may be other m ore respectable reasons for cooperation, but all t hat is needed for this a rgument is that t h ere is at least on e mechanism which can solve the problern of coopera tive incentives. Now, suppose that this m echanism supplies a p erfect solut ion. Both scientist s prefe r mutual coope ration to t a king advantage of a colleague a n d each k nows tha t this is the case not only for hirnself but also for the other scien tist. In t his case, the situation might adopt the structure of a stag hunt game as shown in table 1 (in str a tegic form). As was assumed , A is p erfect ly infor med a b out t he op tions and pr efer ences of his partner B. However , w ha t he should do still depen ds on wh at Bis going to d o. If B coop erates, cooperation is optimal for A , t oo. B u t if B d efect s , A sh ould also d efect. Can A , on the basis of the given information, r easonably expect B to cooper a te? M ayb e, but h e can in no way b e sure about B's cooper ation and h e must realize t ha t B is facing exactly the same problem. So, t he problern of coop er a tion still exists a nd it is in fact a problern of trusting b eh avior.
How can trusting behavior be established as the reasonable ch oice in such a situation?
The game has two equilibria, namely (CA, CB) and (DA, DB ) , so both actors have to decide which equilibrium strategy to choose. A can go for cooperation only if he expects B to cooperate. But what reason can he have for such an expectation? As B is in the same position, he will cooperate if he expects A to cooperate. So, A should have a reason to expect B to h ave t he expectation that A will cooperate. But, again, since B is in the same position, B can have a reason for such an expectation only if he expects A to h ave the exp ectation t hat B will cooperate. Obviously such reasoning can go on endlessly with out ever reaching solid ground. There is no independent reason for any expectation of any order available. Any solution to the problern must presuppose either t hat one of the actors acts in some way or other for no decisive r eason or t hat at least one of them performs some acts on behalf of expectations t hat he cann ot decisively substantiate (cf. Aumann 1990 and Lahno 2002, chapter 3) .
Note that the problern does not arise due to a lack of information. Both actors in fact have all the available information at their d isposal. There simply is no information that could solve the problern except for the information t h at one of the actors solves the problern in some specific way. Thus, there is no information to induce cognitive trust unless trusting behavior exists for other reasons.
One might reply that there is a rational reason t o prefer cooperat ion to defection a nd, thus, tha t there is a r ational reason for a t rusting expect ation in that CA C B is the efficient outcome. But, is this really true? N ot e first t h a t although a cooperative m ove may lead to the most prefe rred outcom e, it may at the same time lead to the least preferred. Defection is the maxim in str at egy. So, if there is doubt, defection m ay b e preferable. Well, this is the very seed of d oubt. How can A be sufficiently sure that B will cooperate under such condit ions? A can only b e sure if h e has sufficient reason to believe that B can b e sure that A will cooperate. But B is in t he same p osition as A. Obv iously t he b ot tomless pit of arguments starts over again.
To solve such problems, individuals need som e sufficien tly clear and binding rule on how to act under such circumstances. They need a normative frame. This is w hat I call the problem of normative consent. Cognitive t r ust based on pure information cannot solve the problern without such a normative frame. But if there is some normative consent an what sort of action the situation calls for, affective trust based on such consent will induce trusting expectations and trusting behavior.
Of course, on ce a normative regime h as been established, pure informat ion on the efficiency of the social norm may suffice to justify trusting expect ations in the sense of pure cognitive trust. However , for this tobe the case, at least some p eople must, in fact, feel committed to the guiding norms and p er ceive oth er s as being committed in t h e same way, i.e. , some people have tobe taking an internal point of v iew in the sense of Herbert H art (1962, 61ff .) towar d the norm for t his to be the case. Otherwise there would b e no normative consent. These people, n ow, will engage in trusting b e havior based on their affective trust. Thus, t here must be some affective trust if a normative consent is t o exist at all. And t his is what we indeed observe: in such situations, we almost always find normative expectations and affectively laden trust.
Conclusion
If my argument is correct, there are three different aspec ts t hat need to be taken into account in the analysis of trustful cooperation. First, t h ere is t h e problern of cooperative incentives: there must be sufficiently st rong incen tives to cooperate such tha t cooperation can be expected at all. Second, there is the problern of information: people must be in a position to acquire inform ation that might make them sufficiently certain that others will act cooperatively. And finally there is the problern of normative consent: to induce t rust in a situation containing some problern of coordination a n orm ative frame is needed. The problern of information points to the need of cognit ive trust, the p rob lern of normative consent calls for affective trust.
Obviously, these three proble msare n ot indep endent of each ot her. Information that trust is rationally possible presupposes that t here is some solution to the problern of cooper a tive incentives. Relevant information on w hat ot hers are motivated to do may very well include information about social n orms. What we believe about others will partly d ep end on how we perc eive t h em. In deed, the reverse is also true: our perception of oth ers heavily dr aws u pon wh at we know and believe about t hem.
So, of course, cognitive a nd affective trust are not independ en t of each oth er. The analysis of trusting cooperation presented he re cannot provide simp le classification s of problem s of cooperation n or is it a sufficient basis to identify any specific trusting interaction as ruled b y one well-defined sort of trust on ly. B ut it does draw our at tention t o the various importa nt aspects of trust and, thus, it may lead us to ask the right questions. This, I think, is in fact true in regar d to the analysis and explanation of successful t rusting cooperation as well as in regard to the problern of forming institutions to foster su ch cooperation.
I am n either a n empirical social scie ntist nor am I a psychologist, so I have to draw on personal experie nces as far as reallife a pplications of my t heoret ical considera tions are con cerned.
Consider eBay-it is a prime example of a ve ry su ccessful cooperative project. One of the mech anisms that is held t o b e decisive in prod ucing trusting coop era tion in eBay is its r eputation-building m echa nism. Such a m echanism d oes two things at once: (1) It provides a solution to the problern of cooperative incen tives by t ying future rewa rds to present b eh avior. (2) It also, simulta n eously, offers a solution t o the problern of information by ma king public personal exp er iences w ith a ny given eBay p articipant.
Still, we also find att empts to form a n ormative frame for eBay t ransact ions . eBay presents itself n ot just as a market place but as a community. When Pierre Omidyar , the faunder of eBay, was asked w hat made eBay so successful, h e replied: "I think it is truly t h e community" (Kavanaugh-Brown 1999). The Every active eBayer knows that eBay has the feel of a community. If I look, for instance, at my evaluations at eBay, this seems obvious to me. Evaluations are, as a rule, not just reports on performance. They express gratitude and connectedness to the partner. And they also emphasize some background normative frame. Thus, a prominent evaluation is 'good eBayer', which is obviously regarded as a meaningful, mostpositive label.
Is this important with regard to the cooperative success of eBay? At first sight, no problern of normative consent seems to exist once the reputation mechanism is effective. Butthis may well be wrong. Any reputation mechanism draws on ongoing interaction. Now, from the theory of iterated games we know that ongoing interaction with an indefinite horizon is always threatened by multiple equilibria (compare e.g. , FU.denberg/Maskin 1986). So, there might very well be a coordination problern like the one introduced above to illustrate the problern of normative consent.
If institutional design is the problem, things get more complex. For, a t least in part, institutional regulations made to meet one p roblern m ay have an impact on the solution of another problem. And that impact may not operate in the same direction regarding trust. If, for instance, a solution to the problern of cooperative incentives is attempted by installing monetary sanctions, w hile a solution to the problern of information is brought about by supplying information on the reliability of the sanctioning mechanism, then t h is will frame the interaction in a specific way. Such an arrangement may signal that there is no normative frame strong enough t o induce cooperation. It p resents people as basically uncooperative and, thus, it may crowd out affect ive t rust ( compare Frey (1997) .
This might well be unimportant with regard to the problern of cooperat ion, for, of course, there are problems which may be solved by cognitive tru st alone. But still, as illustrated by the example in section 7 there are oth er p roblems in which affective trust is required. In such cases, we are facing t h e problern of b a lanc ing the measures to all three problems at a time: the p roblern of coop erative incentives, the problern of information and the problern of n ormat ive consent.
